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ACHIEVING MAXIMUM UNIT MISSION CAPABILITY: 
AN IMPACT STUDY OF SYSTEM AVAILABILITY, 




The highest level of Unit Mission Capability is the ultimate goal of any unit 
commander.  Members of the user community, especially unit commanders, must be 
aware of the factors that influence their war fighting capability.  Understanding these 
factors and their relationships, coupled with the implementation of specific strategies, can 
facilitate maximizing Unit Mission Capability.  This is the primary focus of this project. 
This report will provide aviation unit commanders and user representatives with a 
clear explanation and demonstration of the variables that influence a commander’s ability 
to improve Unit Mission Capability.  The tool demonstrated in this report is the 
Availability, Proficiency, Cost, and Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) model for assessing 
and maximizing Unit Mission Capability. 
The user community must understand how competing funding requirements 
influences their ability to train and maintain a strong fighting force.  Current DOD 
funding levels will decline in the near future.  It will become more and more difficult to 
achieve the desired state of Unit Mission Capability.  Users must implement strategic cost 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
In 1994, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conducted a study that focused 
on the trend indicators of Unit Readiness from 1980 to 1993.1  Unit Readiness is one of 
four pillars that define our military capability.  The other three pillars are force structure, 
modernization, and sustainability.  The Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress 
agree that the driving indicators for Unit Readiness, and ultimately, military capability, 
are proficiency/performance and weapon system availability.   
With ever-increasing demands for budget dollars, Congress maintains an intense 
interest in military capability.  In October 2005, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) published a report that recommended intense congressional oversight of DODs 
plans for addressing military capability gaps.2  Commanders, at all levels, need tools that 
enable proactive examination of the variables that affect our military capability. 
B. PURPOSE 
Aviation unit commanders make difficult choices as they attempt to balance 
training and maintenance readiness.  In a similar manner, aviation user representatives 
must make cost and reliability trade-off decisions.  This report will provide aviation unit 
commanders and user representatives with a clear explanation and demonstration of the 
variables that influence a commander’s ability to improve Unit Mission Capability.  
Users and commanders who do not understand these variables often find themselves 
struggling with lower than expected capability.  This report introduces the user 
community to the Availability, Proficiency, Cost, and Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) 
model for assessing Unit Mission Capability. 
 
                                                 
1 Congressional Budget Office, CBO Papers: Trends in Selected Indicators of Military Readiness, 
1980 through 1993 (Washington, D.C., 1994), 19. 
2 Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees: DOD Needs to Identify 
and Address Gaps and Potential Risks inn Program Strategies and Funding Priorities for Selected 
Equipment (Washington, D.C., 2005), 1. 
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C. SCOPE 
The scope of this report includes an analysis of the complex relationships that 
exist between weapon system availability, proficiency, cost, and OPTEMPO.  This 
analysis includes a statistical study of fluctuations in OPTEMPO and availability.  
However, the statistical examination of proficiency and cost are outside the scope of this 
report.  The concepts discussed in this report apply to any weapon system, even though 
most of the data presented is specific to the AH-64D Longbow Apache (LBA).  This 
report includes data constraints and assumptions where appropriate. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary research question for this study is: How does an aviation unit 
commander maximize Unit Mission Capability?   
Listed below are the secondary Research Questions. 
1.  What can the user community do to increase Unit Mission Capability? 
2.  What terms define Unit Mission Capability? 
3.  How does the variability in OPTEMPO affect Unit Mission Capability? 
4.  How does weapon system availability affect Unit Mission Capability? 
5.  What external factors influence Unit Mission Capability? 
 
E.   ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This report is organized into five chapters.  Each chapter covers a specific 
segment of the study.  The combination of these chapters provides the reader with a clear 
and comprehensive study addressing the primary research question.  Below is a list of the 
individual Chapters.  
• Chapter I:  Introduction 
• Chapter II: Availability, Proficiency, Cost, and OPTEMPO 
(APCO) Model  
• Chapter III: APCO Model and External Factors 
• Chapter IV: Accelerated Depreciation Data Study 




Chapter II introduces the APCO model by proving definitions for the model 
variables and a detailed explanation of the relationships that exist between each of these 
variables.  A step-by-step process is used to describe the foundation and assumptions 
used in the APCO Model.  The Chapter concludes with example applications of the 
APCO model using the LBA and the V-22 Osprey.  Information used to develop this 
chapter comes from literature reviews, interviews and personal experience. 
Chapter III established an informed foundation for this report.  Chapter III 
provides information pertaining to external factors that influence the APCO model.  The 
primary factor discussed in funding.  Information used to construct this chapter comes 
from a review of literature. 
Chapter IV demonstrates the concept of accelerated depreciation.  Statistical 
analysis is conducted using availability and OPTEMPO rate data from the Program 
Management Office (PMO) Apache, and Reliability and Maintainability (RAM) data 
obtained from the RAM Engineering and System Assessment Division, PMO Apache.  
This analysis is applied to the APCO model and conclusions are drawn regarding the 
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II. AVAILABILITY, PROFICIENCY, COST, AND OPTEMPO 
MODEL  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce, define and illustrate the utility of an 
Availability, Proficiency, Cost, and OPTEMPO (APCO) model.  The APCO model is an 
equilibrium model designed to illustrate the relative impact of variables that influence 
total Unit Mission Capability.  This chapter includes definitions for variables, as well as 
an orientation to the graphical model.  This chapter also includes two operational 
capability decision support scenarios designed to illustrate the application of the APCO 
model.     
B. APCO MODEL TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
1. Unit Mission Capability 
 Unit Mission Capability is the unit’s ability to meet its mission requirements.  
This term describes the single goal of every unit commander and is synonymous with 
combat effectiveness.  For a unit to possess a high degree of capability, it must attain the 
requisite level of unit proficiency and equipment availability.  The variables that directly 
affect proficiency and availability include OPTEMPO and cost.  Availability, 
proficiency, cost, and OPTEMPO are defined in more detail later in this chapter.  
2. Availability 
 Availability is simply the ratio of weapon systems available for designated 
combat missions divided by the number of total weapon systems assigned.  This ratio 
equates to Operational Readiness (OR) as seen in unit status reports. 
  
Total number of systems that are currently Mission Capable  
Total number of systems assigned  
 
Figure 1.    Availability Formula 
 
Key components of availability include reliability and maintainability.  These 
components are set early in the system design process and are costly to improve.  The 
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operational availability of a system should be confirmed through robust test and 
evaluation during the development process. 
Availability is directly dependent on the level of OPTEMPO, especially in older 
weapon systems.  This means as OPTEMPO increases, availability will decrease as 
systems reach their point of required maintenance and logistical support quicker. 
3. Proficiency 
 Proficiency is defined as a percentage of authorized crews that are qualified to 
perform assigned mission tasks.  Crew proficiency is the basic element of unit 
proficiency.  A crew is determined to be proficient if they have achieved the minimum 
level of required flight time.  Formula: 
  
Total number of crews qualified to perform unit missions 
Total number of crews assigned 
  
Figure 2.   Proficiency Formula 
 
Proficiency is also dependent on the level of OPTEMPO.  Proficiency will 
increase as OPTEMPO increases.  Conversely, proficiency degradation occurs as 
OPTEMPO decreases.  The longer a unit operates at a less-than-minimal OPTEMPO, the 
longer it will take a unit to regain its required level of proficiency.  
4. Cost 
Cost is the measure of expenses incurred at a specified level of OPTEMPO.  The 
total cost of achieving a desired level of Unit Mission Capability includes the costs 
associated with achieving minimum availability and minimum proficiency.  Funding is 
allocated to cover these costs through the flying hour program.   Other cost drivers that 
affect Unit Mission Capability include training simulation, reliability improvements, and 
other capital improvements. 
Cost is interrelated with OPTEMPO, availability, and proficiency.  As 
OPTEMPO increases to achieve a higher degree of availability or proficiency, costs also 
increase.  The costs incurred per flight hour are often outside the span of control for a unit 
commander and funding for these costs are allocated annually as a flying hour program. 
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5. OPTEMPO 
OPTEMPO is the utilization rate of the weapon system.  It is the measure of flight 
hours per aircraft per month.  OPTEMPO is the independent variable within the APCO 
model.  It drives the other variables.  With few exceptions, commanders set the 
OPTEMPO for their unit.  Normally, the allocated flying hour program limits 
commanders to a maximum OPTEMPO. 
OPTEMPO is a flexible variable used by commanders to balance the demands of 
proficiency and availability.  This fact is especially true when conducting training in a 
resource-constrained environment.  Commanders are faced with difficult trade decisions 
when funding does not support the accomplishment of both availability and proficiency.  
6. Variable Relationships 
Figure 3 below demonstrates the complex relationships that exist between the 
variables defined above.  Unit Mission Capability is a function of proficiency, 
availability, and fully funded costs.  If any of these variable decline below minimum 
levels, there will be a corresponding reduction in the unit’s capability to perform 
designated combat operations.   
Proficiency is a function of availability and OPTMEPO, while availability is a 
function of OPTEMPO and inherent reliability.  These facts demonstrate the complexity 
of their relationships.  Both availability and proficiency are functions of OPTMEPO.  As 
OPTEMPO fluctuates within cost limits, as defined by the flying hour program, a 
decision could be made to trade availability for proficiency.  This decision, consequently, 
has a negative impact on proficiency since availability plays a significant role in 
determining proficiency.  It is unrealistic to expect the achievement of full Unit Mission 




Figure 3.   Unit Mission Capability Model 
 
C. APCO MODEL ORIENTATION 
Each element of the APCO model is an expression of the variables that influence 
a unit commander’s probability of mission success.  These elements, when graphed, 
provide a visual representation of the relative impact of each element.  As mention 
earlier, this model design does not replicate exact numbers.  However, this model will 
accurately depict the magnitude and direction of resulting changes.  Additionally, the 
curves represented in the APCO model are not intended to be viewed independent of 
other elements.  OPTEMPO and Mission Capability do not necessarily have a linear 
relationship.  This representation is for display purposes only.  The underlying premise of 
the APCO model dictates that OPTEMPO will seek a point of equilibrium that supports 
availability, proficiency, and cost. 
1. APCO Model Input and Output 
The APCO model input, represented on the X-axis, is OPTEMPO.  OPTEMPO as 
an input establishes the baseline for analysis.  OPTEMPO, as defined earlier, affects each 
of the model elements and serves as the independent variable for the model.  OPTEMPO 
is the measure of the number of flight hours flown per assigned aircraft in a month.  The  
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starting point for the model is the LBA Block III Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD) input of anticipated utilization, 15 flight hours per month per airframe.3 
The APCO model output, represented on the left side of the Y-axis, is Mission 
Capability.  Mission Capability is met by achieving a minimum level of crew proficiency 
and a minimum level of availability.  Successful command is often determined by a 
commander’s ability to keep these two components in balance.  Mission Capability is 
measured as a percentage of a unit’s ability to meet assigned mission requirements.  The 
starting point in our model is based on 75 percent.  This is the Department of the Army 
fully mission capable rate for all aircraft.4 
 
 




                                                 
3 Department of the Army, Combat Developer Reliability and Maintainability Analysis for the 
Modernized Apache Longbow (Fort Rucker, 2003), 4. 
4 Department of the Army, Army Regulation 700-138: Army Logistics Readiness and Sustainability 
(Washington D.C., 2004), 29. 
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2. Proficiency Curve 
The proficiency curve in the APCO model represents anticipated crew 
performance of unit mission tasks.  The curve is presented as up sloping and generally 
linear with an elbow at the lower and upper portions of the curve.  As OPTEMPO 
increases, crew proficiency increases.   
The lower elbow represents base level system proficiency that is achieved through 
institutional training.  It represents the level at which operator skills will digress below 
entry-level training standards.  This equates to 10 flight hours per month to correspond to 
minimum flight time requirements for aircrews.5  
The elbow at the upper portion represents the point at which crew proficiency will 
degrade due to fatigue and complacency.  It effectively reflects the point of diminishing  
returns.  This equates to 160 flight hours per month.  Most units’ fighter-management 
policies restrict aircrews from performing more than eight hours of flight duty in a 24-
hour period. 
Lettered points are depicted along the proficiency curve to demonstrate its 
function.  Point A indicates a point of balance where the proficiency needed to realize 75 
percent Mission Capability can be achieved with an OPTEMPO of 15 hours.  Point B 
indicates the need to increase OPTEMPO significantly in order to raise proficiency to the 
point of achieving 80 percent Mission Capability.  Point C demonstrates the level of 
proficiency, and corresponding Mission Capability, that is possible at an OPTEMPO of 
108 hours. 
 
                                                 
5 Department of the Army, TC 1-251: Aircrew Training Manual Attack Helicopter AH-64D 
(Washington D.C., 2005), 2-3. 
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Figure 5.   Proficiency Curve 
 
3. Availability Curve 
The availability curve represents mission capable aircraft at a specified level of 
OPTEMPO.  It is presented in the APCO model as linear and down sloping.  In general 
terms, availability will decrease as OPTEMPO increases. 
Reference points are indicated along the availability curve to demonstrate the 
function of this curve.  Point A is located at the point where 80 percent Mission 
Capability falls along the curve and indicates the relative OPTEMPO required to sustain 
this availability.  In this case, the OPTEMPO is lower than the base value of 15 hours.  
Point B is located at the intersection of 75 percent Mission Capability and an OPTEMPO 
of 15 hours.  This point represents the point at which availability meets the stated mission 
capability requirements at an OPTEMPO of 15 hours.  Point C indicates a relative 
reduction in Mission Capability to due to a decrease in availability resulting from an 
increase in OPTEMPO to 108 hours. 
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Figure 6.   Availability Curve 
 
4. Cost Curve 
The cost curve used in the APCO model illustrates the per flight hour sustainment 
costs incurred as OPTEMPO changes.  It is presented as linear in the center section and 
non-linear with up sloping tails.  The intent of the cost curve is to indicate required 
funding reference points for a fluctuating OPTEMPO.   
The non-linear up sloping tails represent increased costs in OPTEMPO ranges 
outside of normal operating levels.  The lower slope is due to the fixed costs associated 
with calendar-based scheduled maintenance.  The upper slope is caused by OPTEMPO 
levels in excess of design reliability characteristics or programmed logistics support. 
Points are displayed along the cost curve to aid in the understanding of its 
function.  Point A is plotted on the cost curve at the point of intersection with proficiency 
and availability.  This indicates full funding of the costs associated with 75 percent 
Mission Capability and an OPTEMPO of 15 hours.  An increase in the OPTEMPO to 108 




Figure 7.   Cost Curve 
 
5. Equilibrium Point 
A point of equilibrium exists at the intersection of the proficiency, availability, 
and cost curves.  This point is characterized by the fulfillment of availability goals and 
proficiency requirements at a given funding level.  The point of equilibrium will move 
when the slope or relative position of the intersecting curves change.  In the APCO 
model, the equilibrium point, depicted as a star, resides at the junction of the specified 
mission capability requirement (75%) and OPTEMPO (15 hours).   
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Figure 8.   Equilibrium Point 
 
As stated earlier, OPTEMPO will seek a point of equilibrium that is supported by 
proficiency, availability, and cost.  An example of this phenomenon is depicted in figures 
9 and 10 below.  The APCO model scenario illustrated indicates a shift in the desired 
Mission Capability from 75 percent to 80 percent. 
Enter the model at 80 percent Mission Capability and continue across until the 
proficiency curve is intersected (point A).  Moving downward from this point will 
provide the relative increase in OPTEMPO needed to achieve 80 percent proficiency.   
 
Additionally, point B indicates the availability curve intersection and the resultant 
Mission Capability.  Mission Capability is significantly lower than the desired 80 percent.   
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Figure 9.   Mission Capability Increase 
 
To compensate for this deficiency, unit commanders will adjust OPTEMPO to 
improve Mission Capability.  They will make an OPTEMPO shift because funding has 
not increased relative to the desired Mission Capability.  This reduced level of Mission 
Capability, as determined by availability, is unacceptable.  The OPTEMPO adjustments 
naturally move in the direction of the equilibrium point.  OPTEMPO reductions result in 
Mission Capability returning to the equilibrium value.   
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Figure 10.   OPTEMPO Movement toward Equilibrium 
 
6. Model Assumptions 
The APCO model includes a number of assumptions designed to facilitate its 
utility.  These assumptions are listed below. 
 
1. OPTEMPO is within a unit commander’s span of control. 
2. This model does not depict external factors that affect Mission Capability, 
e.g. troop strength, mission change, and funding priorities. 
3. Numbers depicted on the axis scales are for relative reference. 
4. Availability is a linear function of OPTEMPO. 
5. Proficiency is a linear function of OPTEMPO within the relative range. 
6. Funding Requirements must support the cost associated with shifting 
either the proficiency curve or the availability curve. 
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7. Numbers used are not exact.  Movement of any line or curve depicted in 
the APCO model is relative and only shows the trend. 
8. Commanders use prudence when distributing flight hours.  
D. APCO MODEL APPLICATION 
Two separate and distinct applications of the APCO model are presented in this 
section.  Each model will demonstrate the utility of the APCO model and provide the user 
with a valuable decision support tool.  The starting point for the first model is the LBA 
Block III ORD Key Performance Parameter (KPP) for Mission Capability.  This ORD 
specified an increase in Mission Capability to 80 percent.6  The basis for the second 
APCO model is reliability of the V-22 Osprey.  The V-22 achieved 57 percent 
availability during Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL).7   
1. LBA Block III ORD Mission Capability KPP 
a. Base APCO Model 
The base model for this scenario has the same basic format as the previous 
APCO models.  The dashed line drawn at 80 percent corresponds to the proposed 
increase in Mission Capability.  This increase is relatively arbitrary since its supporting 
analysis used legacy mission definitions to complete the Operational Mode 
Summary/Mission Profile.8 
The model indicates a significant increase in OPTEMPO with a 
corresponding reduction in availability.  This results in a realized Mission Capability at a 
point substantially below the target.  If the increase to 80 percent is a hard requirement, 
then a shift is needed in either the proficiency curve or the availability curve.  Shifting 
these curves will cause costs to increase and a corresponding funding increase must 
accompany the move.  
                                                 
6 Department of the Army, Operational Requirements Document for the Modernized Longbow, Block 
III, Multi-Role Helicopter (Fort Rucker, 2004), 19. 
7 Department of the Navy, V-22 Osprey Program Brief (Washington D.C., 2001), 20. 
8 Department of the Army, Combat Developer Reliability and Maintainability Analysis for the 
Modernized Apache Longbow (Fort Rucker, 2003), 4. 
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Figure 11.   LBA Block III Mission Capability Base APCO Model 
 
b. Resource Application for Availability 
An application of resources is needed to shift the availability curve to the 
right.  A required availability of 80 percent results in a sustainable OPTEMPO far less 
than proficiency requirements permit.  The initial availability curve (dashed blue line) is 
set by the fielded system’s reliability.  A shift in this curve would require a significant 
investment in sustainment engineering and reliability improvement.   
The availability curve must intersect the proficiency curve at the 80 
percent Mission Capability line.  This will permit a sustainable OPTEMPO that balances 
proficiency and availability.  The net result is a successful attempt at achieving 80 
percent Unit Mission Capability.   
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Figure 12.   Resource Application for Availability 
 
c. Resource Application for Proficiency 
Another way to approach this problem is by allocating resources to shift 
the proficiency curve to the left.  Proficiency must increase while reducing OPTEMPO to 
the required availability point of 80 percent.  The application of non-flight training 
solutions causes an increase in cost.  Examples of training solutions include high fidelity 
flight simulators, cockpit crew trainers, and other ground based training events. 
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Figure 13.   Resource Application for Proficiency 
 
d. Resource Application for Availability and Proficiency 
Given that availability is set early in the design of a system, achieving the 
total magnitude of shift required for the availability curve could be cost prohibitive.  
Additionally, technology may not permit a complete shift of the proficiency curve.  The 
employment of a strategy that shifts both the availability curve and the proficiency curve 
could enable the successful implementation of this Mission Capability improvement.  
Again, this will result in a shift of the cost curve and funding must match this new 
requirement.   
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Figure 14.   Resource Application for Availability and Proficiency 
 
2. V-22 Osprey Mission Capability 
a. Base APCO Model 
The V-22 Osprey presents an interesting application of the APCO model.  
The Navy standard for system availability is 75 percent and the anticipated OPTEMPO 
for the V-22 is 14 hours.  Using the previous APCO model as a base, figure 15 below 
shows the desired Unit Mission Capability for these values.  
The Navy completed an OPEVAL of the V-22 in July 2000.  The 
reliability and maintainability results from the logistics portion of the evaluation indicate 
an availability rate of 57 percent.  The gap, 18 percent, between Navy requirements and 
V-22 achieved results represents a significant deficiency in Unit Mission Capability.  The 
star on the APCO model below indicates the current capability at the intersection of the 
proficiency and availability curves. 
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Figure 15.   V-22 Mission Capability Base APCO Model 
 
b. Resource Application for Reliability Improvements 
The solution to the V-22 capability gap is an increase in funding to 
support the cost of reliability improvements.  These reliability improvements will drive a 
shift in the availability curve to match Navy requirements.  This curve shift also enables 
an OPTEMPO increase needed to support proficiency efforts.  The estimate of funding 
needed to effect this change is $381.1M.9  If these funds are not allocated to the program, 
the result will be V-22 units operating well below required Unit Mission Capability. 
                                                 
9 Department of Defense, Inspector General Audit Report: V-22 Osprey Joint Advanced Vertical 
Aircraft (Arlington, 2000), 6. 
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Figure 16.   V-22 Resource Application 
 
c. Alternate Resource Application for Increased Mission Capability 
Figure 17 depicts an alternate solution to this V-22 problem.  As 
mentioned earlier, extreme reliability improvements may be cost prohibitive.  In this 
situation, it is necessary to address possible proficiency solutions, as well as reliability 
improvements.  By shifting both the availability curve and the proficiency curve, 
achieving the required level of Unit Mission Capability is possible while reducing 
OPTEMPO. 
Implementing this course of action still requires an increase in funding.  
The shift in the cost curve, and the corresponding funding, could be lower than the 
funding required in figure 16.  The application of efficient non-flight training will 
increase proficiency without increasing OPTEMPO.  The net result is a V-22 program 
that meets Unit Mission Capability requirements at a cost that is lower than previously 




Figure 17.   V-22 Alternate Resource Application 
 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter focused on the variables that affect Unit Mission Readiness.  
Relationships exist between these variables.  Users with an understanding of these 
relationships are better prepared to make proactive choices relating to OPTEMPO and 
their desired level of Unit Mission Capability.  A number of external factors influence a 
user’s ability to achieve this desired level of Unit Mission Capability.  The next chapter 
focuses on the external factors that impact funding. 
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III. APCO MODEL AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCE 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II discussed the variables affecting Unit Mission Capability.  It laid out 
the relationships and their influences within the APCO model.  Specifically identified 
was the importance of level of funding in mitigation of the impacts of OPTEMPO and the 
costs associated with a unit’s operations, maintenance and capital improvement 
initiatives.  This chapter will look at the past trends for funding and potential   current 
concerns.  It will also look at future concerns that are currently the focus of discussion 
among senior leaders within our Government (the Department of Defense, Whitehouse, 
Congress…). 
B. BUDGET PROCESS AND FUNDING 
1. Categories of Spending 
Although the budgeting process of the United States Government is beyond the 
focus of this work, it is important to note several key characteristics of that process.  First 
characteristic is that the budgeting process generally differentiates between several 
distinct categories of spending: Mandatory Spending, Net Interest and Discretionary 
Spending. 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) defines mandatory spending as the 
budget authority provided and controlled by laws other than appropriation acts and the 
outlays that result from that budget authority.  In layman’s terms, mandatory spending 
covers areas of spending that are mandated by law and are often referred to as 
entitlements. These include such areas as Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid.  They 
are “set” obligations that require “acts of Congress” to change.   
Net Interest consists of the government's interest payments on debt held by the 
public (as recorded in budget function 900).  This is offset by interest income that the 
government receives on loans and cash balances and by earnings of the National Railroad 
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Retirement Investment Trust.10  Like mandatory spending, Net Interest is “set” and not 
easily influenced or changed.  Discretionary spending, on the other hand, is subject to 
annual legislative appropriations by congress.  As its name implies, Discretionary 
Spending is easily influenced by congress and is subject to turbulent fluctuations each 
year. 
2. Department of Defense Budget 
The second key characteristic is that the Department of Defense’s budget falls 
under discretionary spending.  Its budget makes up the largest portion of that category.  
For this reason, the discretionary category is often broken out into “defense related and 
non-defense related” spending.  Consequently, because of its size (historically 50% or 
greater), defense funding is a prime target for budget cuts. 
 
Figure 18.   Defense Spending 
 
3. Mandatory Spending Trends 
The third and final characteristic is the trend of increasing growth in the size of 
mandatory spending.  An aging population of Baby Boomers, the related social security 
bill and rising healthcare costs (Medicare) are several of the causes.  The percentages in 
the diagram below are only estimations, but CBO predictions show the percentage of  
 
                                                 
10 Congressional Budget Office, Glossary of Budgetary and Economic Terms (Washington, D.C., 
2005). 
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mandatory spending will continue to grow to further “squeeze” discretionary 
expenditures in the coming decades.  This was the basis for a considerable debate during 
the presidential election. 
 
Figure 19.   Mandatory Spending Increase 
 
C. PAST FUNDING LEVELS MASK EFFECTS IN APCO MODEL 
For the past several decades, the level of funding appropriated to the Department 
of Defense has been sufficiently high enough to mask the impacts of lower reliability and 
OPTEMPO.  Simply put, the funds have been there for aircraft to fly more hours 
(maintaining a high level of proficiency) and still pay the bill for the wear and tear on the 
airframes (availability).  This level of funding has made it possible to reach a point above 




Figure 20.   Defense Funding 
 
Periodic Supplemental Appropriation Bills from Congress covering military 
operations are at the root of the masking.  These supplements covered Desert Shield, 
Desert Storm, the War on Terrorism and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  They have 
significantly (artificially) bolstered the Department of Defense funding levels.   
In 2003, 2004 and 2005, supplementals alone equated to an artificial injection of 
defense funding of over $276 billion.  (See Appendix for Supplementals 2003-2005).  
Not only have these dollars gone to fighting the war, but to maintain and upgrade the 
equipment as well.  This has made the normal depreciation associated with the 
OPTEMPO less apparent. 
Many senior defense leaders are concerned though as LTG David Melcher 
conveyed in the following quote.  
My sense is that people want to move away from supplementals and try 
and address more of this in a programmed approach or a budget approach.  
However, it remains to be seen whether that is possible.  In any case, I 
don’t think the market will bear it [supplementals] for year after year to 
come.11 No quote marks 
                                                 
11 Jen DiMascio, “Army Leaders Worried About Increasing Pressure on the Top line Budget,” Inside 
Washington Publishers, 10 October 2005, 1. 
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The Army recently submitted a document to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense stating, “Without continuing supplemental support from Congress, the Army is 
facing a $7 billion-a-year budget shortfall.” It also indicated that the Army intends to rely 
on Congress to fund personnel and reset costs with supplemental appropriations after 
2006.  It estimated $4 billion dollars per year for at least two years after the conflicts end 
in order to reset equipment, which has been operating up to eight times over its normal 
OPTEMPO in an extremely harsh environment.  The document also expressed that “the 
costs for recruiting and the training of soldiers would also be covered by supplementals, 
as they have been in the past several years.”12 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) in a recent report calls into 
question the way the Defense Department formulates its supplemental budget requests to 
fund the global war on terrorism, to the point of urging Congress to direct DOD to better 
explain how money is spent.13 
D. UNEASE OVER DEFICIT GROWTH AND SPENDING 
In his address before the Joint Economic Committee, November 3, 2005, Federal 
Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan stated, “The longer-term prospects for the 
U.S. economy remain favorable.”  However, he still expressed “concern” over the 
magnitude of the federal deficit as a whole and impacts of such recent events as 
hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  This reaffirmed previous addresses in which he conveyed a 
“sense of uneasiness” with the potential future implications.   
Deficit growth equates to diminished defense dollars on a macro-level.  At the 
unit level, reduced funding will equate to tougher decisions by commanders with regard 
to the variables of the APCO model (OPTEMPO, Proficiency and Availability). 
Over the next six years, the Defense Department is weighing $32 billion in cuts to 
major weapon systems and Army force structure.  These reductions may represent only a 
down payment on the total bill facing the Pentagon as federal budget pressures mount.  
                                                 
12 Jen DiMascio, “Future Army Budgets to Come Up Short Without Supplemental Funding,” Inside 
the Army, 19 September 2005, 1. 
13 John Liang, “GAO Questions Manner in Which DoD Requests Supplemental Funds,” Inside 
Washington Publishers, 28 September 2005, 1. 
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The steep cuts, including an $8 billion decrement in fiscal year 2007, were proposed by 
the services after Gordon England, acting deputy defense secretary, directed them to 
nominate $32.1 billion in reductions to their respective programs across the fiscal year 
2007 to 2011 spending plan.  The $32 billion does not “reflect the total shortfall, 
therefore we may need to adjust further in the future,” said England in an interview.14   
The Army is due to shoulder $11.7 billion worth of the new cuts; the Air Force’s 
share is $8.6 billion; the Navy's is $8.5 billion (which includes Marine Corps reductions); 
and defense-wide cuts total $3.3 billion.  For the out-years, the Army must slice $2.3 
billion in FY-07, $2.8 billion in FY-08, $1.2 billion in FY-09 $1.8 billion in FY-10 and 
$3.6 billion in FY-11.  Subsequent cuts, if enacted, will be based on results of the 
Quadrennial Defense Review as well as expected cuts from the White House, which 
would be spelled out in the forthcoming annual Office of Management and Budget “pass-
back memo.” That memo is expected to reflect mounting federal budget pressures, 
including the huge bill expected from Hurricane Katrina relief efforts.15 
In light of the concerns over cuts, LTG Joseph Yakovac, the Army’s military 
acquisition chief, said that he is “very concerned” about pressures on the service’s 
budget.  The strains are from within as well as from outside sources.  Within the Army, 
the budget is strained by the wars, the resulting need to repair and reset equipment used 
in those wars and the Army’s plans for transformation.   
These effects put the Army’s procurement and research and development 
(R&D) goals at some doubt.  We are not going to get what we need 
simultaneously.  Procurement and R&D are likely targets for budget 





                                                 
14 Jen DiMascio and Jason Sherman, “Pentagon to Slash $32 Billion from Service Budgets; More Cuts 
May Follow,” Inside the Army, 2 November 2005, 1.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Jen DiMascio, “Army Budget Chief of Sees Threat to Service’s Budget Priority,” Inside 
Washington Publishers, 3 October 2005, 2. 
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E. FUNDING COMPETITORS: OUTSIDE SOURCES 
As alluded to by LTG Yakovac, many strains (competitors) are vying for the same 
discretionary federal dollars.  Some of the more prominent ones follow: 
1. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and their devastating impacts have already claimed $62 
billion in supplemental appropriations.  In a recent report, the CBO reviewed anticipated 
macroeconomic and budgetary effects of both hurricanes.17  The office examined the 
economic impacts to date and projected impacts from the disruption of production of oil, 
oil products, and natural gas.  Additionally, the report examined the loss of wealth to 
those most directly affected, the needed support for recovery and rebuilding of the 
affected region and overall impacts on the gross domestic product (GDP).  Findings 
concluded that the economic effects of the hurricanes arise from the loss of life and the 
destruction of private and government capital stocks in the Gulf States.   
Hurricane Katrina destroyed considerable numbers of residential structures; 
consumer durable goods, such as motor vehicles, household furnishings, and appliances; 
and business structures and equipment, particularly in the energy and petrochemical 
industries.  
Hurricane Rita appears to have had a smaller impact on residential structures and 
consumer durable goods, but its damage to the energy industry may be as great as or 
greater than Katrina’s impact. The damage to capital stocks has temporarily reduced 
employment and the growth of income in the affected areas. 18 
                                                 
17 Congressional Budget Office, The Macroeconomic and Budgetary Effects of Hurricanes Katrina 




Figure 21.   Net Effect of Hurricane Katrina 
 
Additionally, because of higher prices at the pump, double-digit oil revenues (in 
the billions) flowed into the industry as they reported profits in the quarter immediately 
following the hurricanes.  Exxon Mobil, the world's largest oil company, reported that its 
third-quarter net income jumped 75 percent, to $9.92 billion. Its profit in the first nine 
months of this year - $25.42 billion - already equals its full-year earnings for 2004. This 
year's sales, which topped $100 billion in the last quarter, are expected to exceed those of 
Wal-Mart.19  Contrarily, the estimate loss by the insurance industry may exceed the 
estimated $150 billion. 
2. Transformation Costs 
The Army continued its sweeping transformation in 2005, including the 
fundamental restructuring that makes its primary organizational structure the combat 
brigade instead of the division.  The Future Combat System (FCS) is the material 
component centerpiece of the initiative.  In its unprecedented complexity, FCS confronts 
                                                 
19 Jad Mouawad and Simon Romero, “Big Rise in Profit Puts Oil Giants on Defensive,” New York 
Times, 28 October 2005.   
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the Army with significant technical and managerial challenges in its requirements, 
development, finance, and management.   
Technical challenges include the need for FCS vehicles to be smaller, weigh less, 
and be as lethal and survivable as current vehicles.  This requires (1) a network to collect 
and deliver vast amounts of intelligence and communications information and (2) 
individual systems, such as manned ground vehicles, that are as complex as fighter 
aircraft. Its cost will be very high: its first increment—enough to equip about 1/3 of the 
force—will cost over $108 billion, with annual funding requests running from $3 billion 
to $9 billion per year.  The program’s pace and complexity also pose significant 
management challenges.20  
The Army is using a Lead System Integrator to manage FCS and is using a 
contracting instrument, an Other Transaction Agreement (OTA), which allows for a more 
flexible negotiation of roles, responsibilities, and rights with the integrator.   
The FCS is at significant risk for not delivering required capability within 
budgeted resources. Currently, about 9½ years is allowed from development start to 
production decision. DOD typically needs this period of time to develop a single 
advanced system, yet FCS is far greater in scope. The program’s level of knowledge is 
far below that suggested by best practices or DOD policy: Nearly 2 years after program 
launch and with $4.6 billion invested, requirements are not firm and only 1 of over 50 
technologies are mature. As planned, the program will attain the level of knowledge in 
2008 that it should have had in 2003, but things are not going as planned. Progress in 
critical areas—such as the network, software, and requirements—has in fact been slower, 
and FCS is therefore likely to encounter problems late in development, when they are 
very costly to correct. Given the scope of the program and the fact that FCS will 
command a significant share of the Army’s acquisition budget (particularly that of 
ground combat vehicles) the impact of cost growth could be dire.21  
 
                                                 
20 Government Accountability Office, Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects for Success 
(Washington, D.C., 2005), 3. 
21 Ibid 
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3. Manning Issues: Recruiting, Retention and Incentives 
Army recruiting has suffered significant, continuous shortfalls in all of the 
components (Active, National Guard and Reserves).  Many analysis and senior leaders 
attribute public opinion on the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as major if not the 
most significant contributors.  Retention has also been affected, although not as 
dramatically. 
An indication of the importance of this shortfall lies in senior Army leadership’s 
reaction to the developments.  Many “creative” proposals are currently under 
consideration.  Monetary incentives (direct or indirect) appear to be the foundation for the 
majority of the proposed solutions.  Examples of the proposals include raising the cap on 
signing bonuses for some specialties from $20,000 to $40,000 and shorter enlistments, as 
brief as 18 months are on the table as well as an increase in the age limit cut-off.  These 
fiscally based solutions are double edged, though, in that they drain funds away from the 
whole of the Army’s budget.  Additionally, in some cases, they create further potential 
long-term obligations.  This can be found in service benefits paid out to shorter enlistees 
after completion of their obligation (i.e. GI Bill) or health benefits to older recruits 




Figure 22.   Recruiting Results 
 
Public opinion and polls in general indicate a decline in propensity to join the 
military service as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue.  Recruiters report similar 
feedback, as reported in the opinion poll below, from potential recruits regarding their 





"Which of these do you think is most likely? (1) Iraq will become a stable democracy in the 
next year or two. (2) Iraq will become a stable democracy, but it will take longer than a year or 
two. Or, (3) Iraq will probably never become a stable democracy." 
      .
  Next Year Or Two Longer Never Unsure  
  % % % %  
 10/3-5/05 4 45 49 2  
 9/9-13/05 4 43 50 3  
 8/29-31/05 6 43 48 3  
 12/21-22/03 7 59 31 3  
  
Table 1.   CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll. Oct. 21-23, 2005. 
N=1,008 adults nationwide. MoE ± 4. 
 
"How would you say things are going for the U.S. in its efforts to bring stability and order to 
Iraq? Would you say things are going very well, somewhat well, somewhat badly, or very 
badly?" 
      .







  % % % % % 
 10/3-5/05 4 39 27 28 2 
 8/29-31/05 5 35 29 28 3 
 7/29 - 8/2/05 7 41 29 21 2 
 6/10-15/05 7 33 34 26 0 
 5/20-24/05 5 36 31 26 2 
 4/13-16/05 7 41 32 18 2 
 2/24-28/05 10 43 29 18 0 
 1/14-18/05 5 36 28 29 2 
 11/18-21/04 5 40 26 27 2 
 10/28-30/04 RV 7 40 25 25 2 
 10/14-17/04 RV 5 38 27 28 2 
 7/11-15/04 4 39 28 28 1 
 6/23-27/04 2 38 31 26 3 
 5/20-23/04 3 34 38 22 3 
 4/23-27/04 4 34 31 29 2 
 12/21-22/03 8 57 24 9 2 
 12/14-15/03 12 53 21 10 4 
 11/10-12/03 5 42 28 22 3 
 10/20-21/03 5 49 31 12 3 
 9/15-16/03 5 44 29 18 4 
 8/26-28/03 5 46 31 16 2 
 8/11-12/03 6 47 28 13 6 
 7/03 6 54 25 11 4 
 5/03 11 61 19 5 4 
      .
  
Table 2.   CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll. Oct. 21-23, 2005. 
N=1,008 adults nationwide. MoE ± 4. 
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The American killed in action (KIA) body count has surpassed 2000, while 
insurgent attacks (particularly improvised explosive devices) continue unrelentingly.  
Reports in the media of stop-loss measures and involuntary extension are also negative 
persuaders.  Reports of the heavily, potentially over-extended use of guard and reserve 
forces and multiple rotations have also been detractors.  All indicators, in spite of fiscal 
incentives thus far, point to continued shortfalls in recruitment and unit manning. 
Again, it is important to consider the point that all of these concerns equate to 
fewer dollars availability at the unit level to balance the APCO model to reach the desired 
level of equilibrium.   
F. AN AGING FLEET 
“Aging” weapon systems, equipment and vehicle fleets are emerging as another 
significant competing concern.  Many of our current systems were procured during the 
heavy defense spending years that characterized President Reagan’s term in office.  There 
was a significant flow of new equipment into the Armed Forces during that period.  They 
were new technologically advanced items at the time.  That equipment has now aged and 
is in need of repair and/or replacement.  Various defense officials share the sentiment that 
“We have big bills coming up [in the replacement of those systems].”   
1. Wear and Tear from Combat Operations 
GAO’s report on the aging effects of current war indicates the significantly 
accelerated wearing out equipment.  The consequential early replacement and reset 
requirements are aptly depicted in the APCO model.  The CBO testified that the potential 
costs resulting from increased usage of military equipment in ongoing operations in Iraq 
could equate to over $9 billion from the Army alone for the year 2005.22  They estimate 
significant acceleration on those vehicles and equipment.  They further acknowledge the 
effects of such upgrades as up-armor in that they increase a vehicle’s weight beyond its 
initial design parameters also causing earlier wear out.    
                                                 
22 Congressional Budget Office, The potential costs resulting from increased usage of military 
equipment in ongoing operations (Washington, D.C., 2005), 2. 
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Illustrative Relationship between Vehicle Usage, Age, and Lifetime  
(Miles on odometer) 
 
 
Figure 23.   Vehicle Usage, Age and Lifetime  
Source: Congressional Budget Office 
 
Army Equipment Use In-Theater in 2005
                           
Value of Equipment Assumed OPTEMPO Increase in Annual 
(Millions of dollars) Lifetime Ratio Depreciation 
        (Years) (Wartime/        
     peacetime)   
In Outside   Millions 
  Divisions Divisions   Percent of Dollars
Aviation 4,150  8,980 20 2 5  660
Tracked 
Vehicles and 
Other Weapons 9,540  0 30 5 13  1,270
Trucks 2,110  1,930 20 10 45  1,820
Other 4,630  0 20 5 20  930
              
 Total 20,430  10,910 n.a. n.a. n.a.  4,680
                           
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Army. 
Note: OPTEMPO = operating tempo; n.a. = not applicable. 
  




2. Force Composition 
In a current report, the GAO reviewed current force compositions and 
employment (mix of Active, Reserve and National Guard).  The GAO concluded that the 
Guard is working on an old business model in which it only deployed in the later stages 
of a major conflict if needed. As a result, Guard units on average are only provided 65 
percent to 74 percent of the personnel and 65 percent to 79 percent of the equipment 
required to conduct their wartime duties, the report said.23    
While deploying, Army National Guard units have had priority for getting the 
equipment they needed.  Readying these forces has degraded the equipment inventory of 
the Guard’s non-deployed units.  This threatens the Guard’s ability to prepare forces for 
future missions at home and overseas. Non-deployed Guard units now face significant 
equipment shortfalls because (1) they have been equipped at less than war-time levels 
with the assumption that they could obtain additional resources prior to deployment and 
(2) current operations have created an unanticipated high demand for certain items, such 
as armored vehicles. To fully equip its deploying units, as of July 2005, the Army 
National Guard had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from its non-
deployed units. As of May 2005, such transfers had exhausted the Guard’s inventory of 
more than 220 high demand equipment items, such as night vision equipment, trucks, and 
radios. Further, as equipment requirements for overseas operations continue to evolve, 
the Army has been unable to identify and communicate what items deploying units need 
until close to their scheduled deployments, which challenges the Guard to transfer needed 
equipment quickly. To meet the demand for certain types of equipment for continuing 
operations, the Army has required Army National Guard units to leave behind many 
items for use by follow-on forces, but the Army can account for only about 45 percent of 
these items and has not developed a plan to replace them.24 
                                                 
23 Associated Press, “Army NG Short of Equipment at Home,” Army Times, 21 October 2005.  
24 Government Accountability Office, Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment 
Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives (Washington, D.C., 
2005), 2. 
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As of June 05, Army National Guard units had left overseas more than 64,000 
pieces of equipment worth more than $1.2 billion, and the Army cannot account for more 
than half.  Pennsylvania Gov. Ed Rendell, said that items sent in their replacement are not 
the same quality or quantity.  Additional, Idaho’s governor identified the same issue 
further stating that his state will not be protected in a disaster or terrorist attack.  Lt. Gen. 
David Melcher, deputy chief of staff of the Army, agreed with the report's findings 
concluding that $21 billion will be spent from 2006 to 2011 to replace equipment and 
modernize the Army National Guard.  "Quite simply, we are robbing the non-deployed 
Peter to pay the deployed Paul," said committee Chairman Thomas Davis, R-Va.25   
3. Mission Creep 
A final competitor is mission creep.  Lessons from Hurricane Katrina require that 
the military assume a greater role during major disasters, said Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Security Paul McHale (an initiative also endorsed by the senior 
level of the administration).  The Pentagon is planning to take a larger role responding to 
"catastrophic" events within the United States such as natural disasters and terrorist 
attacks.  They are developing plans to use active duty troops to respond to an avian flu 
pandemic, the Defense Department's top homeland security official said.   He however, 
also reflected wariness within the military over the added duties. Many fear that active 
duty troops are already stretched by protracted deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.26   
This combined with further Homeland Security initiatives could prove an additional 
challenge. 
G. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
It is clear that defense funding will diminish in the near future.  Consequently, the 
relationships identified and discussed within the APCO model will be more prevalent and 
pertinent as fiscal resources become constrained.  It is key for current and future 
commanders to be aware of the less obvious consequences of their decisions.  The model 
provides a tool when perhaps it will be most needed. 
                                                 
25 Associated Press, “Army NG Short of Equipment at Home,” Army Times, 21 October 2005. 
26 Mark Mazzetti, “Military's Role to Expand in Disaster Relief, Disease Outbreaks,” Los Angeles 
Times, 20 October 2005. 
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IV. ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION DATA STUDY 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter III presented a wide range of external factors that influence the APCO 
model.  The best way to represent the relevance of these factors is to apply the APCO 
model to actual unit OPTEMPO and availability data.  This chapter will demonstrate the 
concept of accelerated depreciation and introduce the element of time.  OPTEMPO over 
time has a unique impact in shaping the nature of the availability curve.     
B. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Monthly operational availability and OPTEMPO data for the LBA was collected 
between 1999 and 2005.  This data provides the basis for the statistical analysis.  The data 
is segregated into three discrete samples with various definitions.  Regression analysis is 
the tool applied to determine the relationship of availability to OPTEMPO.  The results of 
the regression analysis are found in appendix A. 
Each of these discrete data sets provided similar results.  The slope of availability 
curve is determined to be linear with a near-zero slope and a Y-intercept value of 78-82 
percent.  This means that as OPTEMPO increases, availability will hold relatively 
constant at approximately 80 percent.  These results are possibly inconsistent with the 
assumption listed in chapter II.  The following sections will reveal the explanation of this 
possible inconsistency. 
C. APCO MODEL WITH LBA DATA  
The results of the regression analysis are applied to the availability curve in the 
APCO model in the figure below.  This model portrays the effect of having a predictable 
availability rate.  A commander can select any level of OPTEMPO needed to maintain 
proficiency and they will not have to trade-off availability.  As long as funding remains 
consistent with the selected OPTEMPO, a commander would choose to maximize 
proficiency while continuing to operate his systems at an increased rate.  This represents 
the environment that commanders of LBA battalions have been facing for the past five 
years.   
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The assumptions listed in chapter II for the shape of the availability curve were 
based on the total life of a weapon system.  As the LBA continues to age, it will become 
increasing difficult to maintain this level of steady-state availability.  This system is 
rapidly entering the wear-out phase of its useful life.  The entrance into the wear-out 
phase is accelerated due to a significant increase in OPTEMPO.  The actual impacts of 
increased levels of OPTEMPO are not apparent unless the element of time is considered.  
 
Figure 24.   APCO Model with LBA Data 
 
D. IMPACT OF ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION 
As operational requirements continue to drive up weapon system OPTEMPO, the 
systems are impacted by the element of time.  Accelerated depreciation is the term used 
to explain the phenomena of decreasing the useful life of weapon system through the 
mismanagement of OPTEMPO.  The chart in the figure below describes the cause and 




Figure 25.   Accelerated Depreciation 
 
1. Cause of Accelerated Depreciation 
The LBA user requirement defined a weapon system with an anticipated service 
life of 4500 flight hours over a 20-year period.27  This equals an OPTEMPO of 225 flight 
hours per year.  The current (Jan-Jul 05) OPTEMPO is 418 hours.  Figure 2 represents 
these values and the widening gap between disciplined OPTEMPO management and 
actual OPTEMPO.  This gap will reach maximum displacement well before the use life 
of the system is achieved.  At this point, significant cost decisions must be weighed to 
overcome the potential shortfall of having an overextended weapon system in the 
inventory. 
2. Decision Options 
Three options exist for a weapon system that is about to reach the limits of its 
useful life.  The first is the buy back of availability.  This is accomplished through the 
funding and implementation of a robust RESET program.  This program effectively 
extends the designed hour limits of the system through component replacement and 
upgrade. 
The second option is to continue to operate the system beyond its useful life.  This 
option is often unacceptable due to the exponentially increasing cost of logistics support.  
                                                 
27 Department of the Army, Operational Requirements Document for the Modernized Longbow, Block 
III, Multi-Role Helicopter (Fort Rucker, 2004), 6. 
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Historically, weapon systems become more difficult to maintain as they are operated 
beyond their useful life.  This leads to less than acceptable levels of availability.  
The third option involves the program initiation for a replacement system.  The 
costs associated with a new system can reach into the billions of dollars.  The most 
significant impact of this decision often comes from not making a timely commitment to 
a new system.  Often times the DOD is operating in a period of overlapping options, 
future increasing costs. 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The influences in Chapter III provide an interesting backdrop to the discussion 
presented in the previous paragraphs.  Many weapon systems are beyond this point of 
service life decision.  The DOD is faced with difficult choices brought on by accelerated 
depreciation at precisely the same time of anticipated budget reductions. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The objective of this research project was to provide unit commanders with a 
valuable tool for maximizing Unit Mission Capability.  This was accomplished through 
the detailed presentation of the APCO model.  Additionally, this project provides a 
comprehensive look at the external factors that influence the APCO model.  This chapter 
provides the recommendations and conclusions relevant to these presentations. 
B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Secondary Question #1:  What can the user community do to increase Unit 
Mission Capability?  
The user community, specifically aviation unit commanders, can increase Unit 
Mission Capability through accurate management of system OPTEMPO.  Chapter II 
demonstrates that the disciplined management of OPTEMPO will provide higher Unit 
Mission Capability.  Additionally, chapter IV demonstrates that disciplined management 
contributes to the life support of the weapon system.  
Secondary Question #2:  What terms define Unit Mission Capability?   
Weapon system availability, crew proficiency, cost management, and OPTEMPO 
define Unit Mission Capability.  Chapter II demonstrates that these variables have a 
complex and interrelated relationship to each other.  Availability and proficiency directly 
contribute to Unit Mission Capability.  This represents the epic struggle between training 
and maintenance for aviation unit commanders.  Although some of these factors are 
difficult to measure, e.g., proficiency, it is important to understand the relative 
relationship of each variable. 
Secondary Question #3:  How does the variability in OPTEMPO affect Unit 
Mission Capability?   
OPTEMPO has a profound effect on Unit Mission Capability.  OPTEMPO 
represents the independent variable in the APCO model.  This holds true since a 
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fluctuation in OPTEMPO influences each of the other variables.  This is demonstrated in 
Chapter II.  Commanders will face long-term availability challenges when OPTEMPO 
exceeds the rate established at inception of the weapon system.       
Secondary Question #4:  How does weapon system availability affect Unit 
Mission Capability?   
Availability directly influences Unit Mission Capability.  As defined in Chapter 
II, capability decreases as availability decreases.  Commanders are able to sustain a high 
degree of proficiency when availability remains consistently above minimum standards.  
The opposite is true if availability is below minimum standard.  Commanders need the 
right balance of weapon system availability and proficiency in order to achieve success in 
combat. 
Secondary Question #5:  What external factors affect Unit Mission Capability?   
Factors outside the control of unit commanders also contribute to Unit Mission 
Capability.  Chapter III indicates that the most significant external factor is funding.  
Many programs compete for government funding and funding for operations and 
maintenance is one of the few pots of money that Congress can touch each year.  The 
funding level, or the flying hour program for aviation units, must be commensurate with 
stated Unit Mission Capability goals.   
Primary Research Question:  How does an aviation unit commander maximize 
Unit Mission Capability?   
Aviation Unit Commanders must be aware of that factors that influence Unit 
Mission Capability.  This includes both internal and external factors.  The APCO model 
is a tool designed to assist commanders as they gain this necessary understanding.   
The user community must understand how competing funding requirements 
influences their ability to train and maintain a strong fighting force.  Current DOD 
funding levels will decline in the near future.  It will become more and more difficult to 
achieve the desired state of Unit Mission Capability.  Users must implement strategic cost 
saving initiatives to preserve our war fighting capability.  
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Commanders and users must implement strong management policies for weapon 
systems OPTEMPO.  OPTEMPO affects Unit Mission Capability on a daily basis.  
Sustain over utilization results in the accelerated depreciation of weapon systems.  This 
accelerated depreciation is costly in term of availability and proficiency.  Chapter IV 
clearly demonstrates the effects of accelerated depreciation. 
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
The scope of this report included using actual LBA availability and OPTMEPO 
data.  Further research could include the study of unit data from older weapon systems.  
Proficiency and maintenance costs could also be included in this type of study.  This 
would enable further development of the APCO model. 
Funding was the primary external factors covered in this report.  Further research 
could include other distracters that influence Unit Mission Capability.  This type of study 
could include personnel tempo, training distracters, or unit structure.  Sensitivity analysis 
could be used to determine which factor has the greatest impact. 
Further research could include a study of the Unit Mission Capability of V-22 
squadrons.  These squadrons have unique challenges associated with shipboard 
operations.  Additional variables and constraints influence this type of unit.  This type of 
research would reveal the capability of the V-22 to accomplish required missions.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The highest level of Unit Mission Capability is the ultimate goal of any unit 
commander.  Members of the user community, and especially unit commanders, must be 
aware of the factors that influence their war fighting capability and implement specific 
strategies designed to maximize Unit Mission Capability.  The APCO model is an 
especially powerful decision making tool designed to assess Unit Mission Capability. 
External factors will have a significant impact on mission capability in the years 
to come.  DOD budgets in the future will be constrained and declining weapon system 
availability will influence a commander’s ability to achieve maximum Unit Mission 
Capability.  Our aging fleet of weapon systems will not be able to avoid the effects of  
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accelerated depreciation.  The efficient management of OPTEMPO is the responsibility 
of the user community.  OPTEMPO management is the key to sustaining a unit’s mission 






















APPENDIX:  DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS 
FULL DATA SET 
The first data set used to establish the parameters of the availability curve 
included all 411 data points.  The correlation coefficient indicates that no relationship 

















FILTERED DATA SET 
The second data set incorporated a number of refinements designed to eliminate 
inconsistencies.  The data points that exceeded the following limits were excluded: 
1. OPTEMPO less than 2.00 hours per month 
2. OPTEMPO greater than 40.00 hours per month 
3. Availability less than 50 percent 
4. This data set consists of 336 data points.   
The correlation coefficient indicates that no relationship exists between Ao and 














R2 = .0480 
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LIMITED DATA SET 
The third data set incorporated an additional refinement intended to eliminate 
further inconsistencies.  The period of the data was restricted to peacetime only by 
eliminating availability and OPTEMPO data point beyond July 2002.  This data set 
consists of 101 data points.   
The correlation coefficient indicates that no relationship exists between Ao and 
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